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Abstract
Policy diffusion is a common phenomenon in federal states: indeed, one of the normative justifications
of decentralized policy making is that it permits the development and spread of best practices. Following
Berry and Berry (1990), event-history analysis has been the method of choice for the quantitative
investigation of policy diffusion, but Volden (2006) has recently introduced a dyadic variant of this
method in which units of analysis are not states but, instead, pairs of states. This article discusses the
dyadic approach with a particular focus on the diffusion of policies in Switzerland. The goal is not to
introduce a new method, but rather to provide a practical overview for researchers interested in using it.
The article shows how the method has migrated from the international relations literature to the
policy-diffusion literature, describes the typical structure of a dyadic dataset in a diffusion context, and
discusses several modeling issues. The usefulness of the dyadic approach is illustrated empirically with
the example of health-insurance subsidy policies in Swiss cantons.
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Empirical Modeling of Policy Diffusion in 
Federal States: The Dyadic Approach
Fabrizio Gilardi and Katharina FüGlister
University of Zurich and University of Lausanne
Policy diffusion is a common phenomenon in federal states: indeed, one of the norma-
tive justifications of decentralized policy making is that it permits the development and 
spread of best practices. Following Berry and Berry (1990), event-history analysis 
has been the method of choice for the quantitative investigation of policy diffusion, 
but Volden (2006) has recently introduced a dyadic variant of this method in which 
units of analysis are not states but, instead, pairs of states. This article discusses the 
dyadic approach with a particular focus on the diffusion of policies in Switzerland. 
The goal is not to introduce a new method, but rather to provide a practical overview 
for researchers interested in using it. The article shows how the method has migrated 
from the international relations literature to the policy-diffusion literature, describes 
the typical structure of a dyadic dataset in a diffusion context, and discusses several 
modeling issues. The usefulness of the dyadic approach is illustrated empirically with 
the example of health-insurance subsidy policies in Swiss cantons.
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Introduction
Policy diffusion has been a classic topic in the literature on federalism, 
which political scientists – especially in the United States – have studied 
for a long time (McVoy 1940; Walker 1969; Gray 1973; Berry and Berry 
1990; Mintrom 1997). The normative starting point is the idea that autono-
1 Previous versions of this article were presented at the 2006 and 2007 Annual Congress 
of the Swiss Political Science Association, and at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association. We thank the participants in these conferences, Isabelle Sta-
delmann-Steffen, Katerina Linos, and two anonymous referees for helpful feedback. The 
financial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation (grants no. 100012–105763/1 
and PA001–115307/1) is also gratefully acknowledged.
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mous subnational units work as policy laboratories in which new policies 
can be developed, tested, and, if they are successful, spread to the whole 
country. Following this view, federalism promotes policy learning.
Initially, the literature focused on geographic proximities to explain 
policy diffusion, but recently, more sophisticated explanations have been 
developed. Volden (2006), for instance, has shown that successful policies 
are more likely to spread, which is consistent with learning arguments. 
Another recent development is the idea to study diffusion not only between 
units at the same level (such as states), but also across levels (cities, states, 
country) (Shipan and Volden 2006). In addition, a growing literature has 
examined how policies diffuse internationally in a wide range of domains, 
including economic policies (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006; Sim-
mons and Elkins 2004; Meseguer 2006a; Meseguer 2004; Swank 2006), 
regulatory policies (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005; Levi-Faur 2005; Gilardi 
2005), and social policies (Brooks 2005; Brooks 2007; Jahn 2006; Franz-
ese and Hays 2006; Weyland 2007; Gilardi, Füglister, and Luyet 2009).2
The argument that policies spread across subnational units is obvi-
ously highly relevant for Switzerland, although, due to the limited size of 
the Swiss political science community, no Swiss literature on the subject 
has developed. A few studies exist, however. Schaltegger (2004), for in-
stance, found that cantonal fiscal policies are influenced by the practices 
of neighbors, while Kübler and Widmer (2007) concluded that cantonal 
implementations of a federal drug program diffused both regionally and 
country wide.
The diffusion literature is essentially quantitative (for an exception, see 
Weyland 2007), and the method of choice has been event-history analy-
sis, which is a technique specifically focused on the longitudinal study of 
the occurrence of events (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Following 
Berry and Berry (1990), scholars have conceptualized the dependent vari-
able as the adoption of a policy (the “event”) and have used event-history 
tools to investigate its determinants. In these studies, units of analysis are 
state-years (or country-years, city-years, etc.): each state is tracked over 
time until the policy is adopted (or not, in which case the observation is 
said to be right censored). If the dependent variable is continuous, we have 
a typical time-series cross-section dataset, in which units of analysis are, of 
course, also state-years.
2 For overviews of this literature, see Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006), Braun and 
Gilardi (2006), Braun, Gilardi, Füglister, and Luyet (2007), Meseguer and Gilardi (2008).
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The goal of this article is to offer a practical guide to a new version of 
these methods recently put forward by Volden (2006), namely, the dyadic 
approach. In this approach, units of analysis are not state-years, but are 
instead dyad-years in which a dyad is a pair of states. While dyadic studies 
are widespread in the international relations literature (where dependent 
variables are often relational – war, for instance), Volden (2006) had the 
insight to use the dyadic approach to study diffusion. As we will see, this 
approach allows researchers to conveniently model various hypotheses on 
diffusion processes. Each state is, in turn, allowed to be the potential “re-
ceiver” and “sender” of a policy, and independent variables can measure 
the characteristics of both “receivers” and “senders”, as well as their rela-
tionships. With this setup, many indicators of diffusion mechanisms can be 
directly included in the analysis. On the other hand, the dyadic approach 
requires the redefinition the dependent variable from the simple adoption 
of a policy to some form of “increased similarity” between states in the 
dyad.
We strongly emphasize that the goal of this article is not to develop a 
new method or to improve existing ones. More modestly, we aim to present 
a practical guide to the dyadic approach for researchers interested in using 
it. As we will see, dyadic methods are not entirely straightforward, and 
there are many subtleties researchers need to be aware of to use them ap-
propriately. Therefore, this overview will be useful for scholars wishing to 
study diffusion with quantitative tools. Finally, let us note that policy dif-
fusion is a highly relevant topic for the study of public policies in Switzer-
land, but the methods presented here can be applied to any setting in which 
diffusion hypotheses can plausibly be developed. Our main focus here is, 
however, on Switzerland.
The article is structured in two main parts. In the first, we present the 
dyadic approach, and we discuss several methodological issues, including 
the construction of a dyadic dataset and the definition of the dependent var-
iable, standard event-history analysis issues, dependence structure, cross-
sectional heterogeneity, and potential “emulation biases”. The second part 
offers an empirical illustration based on an original dataset of health-insur-
ance subsidy policies in Swiss cantons. In the conclusion, we sum up the 
main points, and we discuss their relevance. Finally, an appendix presents 
Stata code for the construction of a dyadic dataset.
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The Dyadic Approach
From International Relations to Policy Diffusion
The dyadic approach has been widely used in the international relations 
literature, where often the dependent variable does not measure attributes 
of countries but rather of pairs of countries. For instance, when schol-
ars investigate the “democratic peace” hypothesis, which states that de-
mocracies do not fight each other, the dependent variable is whether two 
countries are at war in a given year, or whether a given country initiates 
a conflict against another country (see, for example, Maoz and Russett 
1993; Farber and Gowa 1997; Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998; Hensel, 
Goertz, and Diehl 2000; Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 2002; Leeds 
2003; Danilovic and Clare 2007). Similarly, the relevant units of observa-
tions are dyads also when researchers study international trade flows and 
who trades with whom (Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998), or why 
countries sign bilateral investment treaties (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 
2006). For these research questions, the dependent variable is inherently 
dyadic because it measures the relationship between states rather than their 
characteristics, and taking pairs of countries as observations is a natural 
choice. Models have the following general form:
 yijt = α + Xijt β + ϵijt, (1)
where i, j, and t indexes are, respectively, “receivers”, “senders”, and time, 
yijt is a vector of relational outcomes, Xijt is a matrix of measures for the 
characteristics of the dyad, and β is a vector of coefficients to be estimat-
ed.
For example, Gartzke (2007) examines the economic aspects of the 
democratic peace, and argues that democratic pairs are less prone to con-
flict because they tend to be economically more developed and to have 
more open financial markets. The dependent variable is coded 1 when a 
militarized dispute begins between the two countries in the dyads and 0 
otherwise, and the analysis includes the following independent variables:
“Democracy (low)” and “Democracy (high)”, which measure 
(through various indicators) the lower and higher democracy scores 
in the dyad;
“Financial openness (low)” and “Trade dependence (low)”, which 
report the lower scores in the dyad for indicators measuring, re-
•
•
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spectively, restrictions on foreign exchange, current-and capital ac-
counts, and the ratio of trade over GDP;
“GDP per capita (low)”, which measures the lower GDP per capita 
in the dyad;
“Affinity”, which reports the similarity of interests in the dyad, 
measured through voting patterns in the UN general assembly; and
A series of controls, such as geographic contiguity and distance, ma-
jor power status (coded 1 if at least one state in the dyad is a major 
power), military alliances (1 if the two states in the dyad are allies), 
capability ratio, and region.
We see that all of these variables are measured at the level of the dyad, and 
the statistical model thus corresponds to equation (1). Indeed, Gartzke’s 
(2007) study, like many others, adopts a “nondirected” approach (Bennett 
and Stam 2000), meaning that each dyad appears in the dataset only once, 
and no distinction is made between “initiators” and “targets” of conflict. 
Thus, the United States–Iraq dyad is equivalent to the Iraq–United States 
dyad. However, we also see that a workaround is employed to include 
monadic variables (that is, variables that are measured at the level of the 
state rather than at that of the dyad), namely, the distinction between “low” 
and “high” values in the dyad. While this distinction does not permit iden-
tification of the relevant country in the dyad (we do not know which one 
has “low” or “high” values), it does incorporate information that is not 
strictly dyadic.
Some authors have argued that an explicitly “directed” approach is of-
ten necessary, as in many cases theoretical hypotheses do not just specify 
which dyads are more likely to be at conflict, but also reveal which country 
initiates it (Bennett and Stam 2000; Reiter and Stam 2003). Directed mod-
els have the following form:
 yijt = α + Xijt β + Vit γ + Wjt δ + ϵijt, (2)
where yijt is a vector of relational outcomes, Vit is a matrix of measures for 
the characteristics of the first state in the dyad, Wjt is a matrix of measures 
for the characteristics of the second state in the dyad, and β, γ, and δ are 
vectors of coefficients to be estimated. The main difference with respect to 
the nondirected approach is that variables do not only measure dyadic at-
tributes, but also the monadic features of the two states that are part of the 
dyad. On the other hand, the dependent variable remains dyadic: it meas-
ures an observable relationship between the two countries. An example of 
•
•
•
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directed analysis is Bennett (2006), which investigates how political simi-
larity, rather than joint democracy, promotes peace. The dependent vari-
able measures whether a state initiates a conflict against another state, and 
the independent variables capture attributes of the potential “initiator” and 
of the potential “target”, notably democracy and power, and characteristics 
of the dyad such as geographic proximity and alliances. The model thus 
follows the general specification shown in equation (2), which is adopted 
also in several other studies (for example Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam 
2005; Bussmann and Oneal 2007; Danilovic and Clare 2007).
In sum, dyads are a natural level of analysis for many questions in the 
international relations literature. By contrast, focusing on dyads when 
studying policy diffusion is less obvious. In the policy-diffusion literature, 
there is an explicit interest in relationships between states, but this is es-
timated rather than observed. While we can measure whether a country 
initiated an armed conflict against another country in a given year, the in-
fluence of a state on another state’s policy choices is unobservable and 
has to be estimated. The advantage of the dyadic approach is that observ-
able relationships of theoretical interest, such as geographic proximity or 
similarities in socio-economic structures, can be included easily into the 
analysis. In a directed approach, the first state in the dyad can be identi-
fied as the potential “receiver” of a policy and the second as the potential 
“sender”, and their attributes can be taken into account easily. This insight 
is due to Volden (2006), who used a directed dyadic setup to study how 
states in the United States influence one another in the development of 
their Children’s Health Insurance Programs. More precisely, Volden inves-
tigated the conditions under which a state makes its policy more similar to 
that of another state, and found that this is more likely when the two states 
share political, demographic, and budgetary similarities. The main finding 
is, however, that “successful” states are more likely to be imitated, which 
suggests that decentralized policy making encourages a quite rational form 
of policy learning.
The definition of the dependent variable in dyadic diffusion studies is 
different both from standard state-year diffusion analyses and from dyadic 
analyses in international relations. In the former, the dependent variable is 
1 when a state adopts a policy and 0 otherwise; in the latter, it is 1 when 
the dyadic relationship of interest, such as militarized conflict or the signa-
ture of a bilateral trade agreement, is observed. In dyadic diffusion studies, 
by contrast, observations are dyad-years, but the observable phenomenon, 
policy change, is at the state-year level. Therefore, the dependent variable 
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of the analysis must be constructed indirectly. Volden (2006) codes it 1 
when the potential “receiver” makes its policy more similar to that of the 
“sender”. As a result, the dependent variable does not record policy change, 
nor the influence of one state over another, but simply increased similarity 
in the policies of two states. Since the focus is not on the bilateral relations 
among the two states but on the general diffusion process, the goal is then 
to detect systematic patterns in increased similarities, and to estimate the 
influence of various factors on the decisions of states to introduce policy 
changes that move them closer to other states. This permits one to make in-
ferences about the underlying diffusion process, which, however, remains 
unobserved.
Dataset Structure and Dependent Variable
The structure of a dyadic dataset is not completely obvious, especially in a 
diffusion context. In this section we will first show how a dyadic dataset is 
constructed, and we will then discuss some issues linked to the definition 
of the dependent variable. Table 1 shows an excerpt of a hypothetical dy-
adic dataset. Since most of the time the raw data are in a state-year format, 
its construction is not entirely trivial. Stata code is presented in Appendix 
1 and can be easily adapted to other datasets.
Each row lists a dyad-year, which is the unit of analysis. The first col-
umn indicates the first canton in the dyad, that is, the potential “receiver” 
of a policy, while the second column shows the second canton, the poten-
tial “sender”. Note that the dataset is directed: each dyad appears twice, 
which allows each canton to be in turn a potential “sender” and “receiver”. 
The third column is simply the year, and columns 4–6 report identifiers 
for the first and second canton, as well as for the dyad (their use will be 
explained later). The seventh column lists the dependent variable, which 
we call “imitation”. As discussed earlier, in contrast to the international 
relations literature, the dependent variable here is unobservable. We cannot 
observe whether a canton imitates another canton: indeed, estimating this 
influence is the main goal of the analysis. What we can observe is policy 
change, but this is measured at the level of cantons, not of dyads. The solu-
tion found by Volden (2006) is to code the dependent variable 1 if, at time t, 
Statei adopts a policy that Statej already had at time t–1. The logic appears 
clearly if we look a the various dyads in Table 1. For the Geneva–Zurich 
dyad, the potential “receiver” (Geneva) does not change its policy during 
the observation period, as shown in the “Policyi” column. The potential 
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“sender” does change its policy (see “Policyj” column), but this is irrel-
evant. “Imitation” is thus 0 for all years. By contrast, in the Zurich–Geneva 
dyad, the potential “receiver” (now Zurich) changes its policy from 1 to 
2 in 2002. Since the potential “sender” had policy 1 in the previous year, 
“Imitation” is now coded 1: Zurich has adopted a policy that Geneva al-
ready had. The Zurich–Schywz dyad conforms this logic: Zurich changes 
its policy in 2002, but not in the same direction as Schwyz. Therefore, the 
dependent variable is coded 0 even though there is a policy change. We 
see that the dependent variable does not measure policy change nor does it 
influence, but it only shows the potential influence. The goal of the analysis 
is to detect systematic patterns in policy changes that move some cantons 
closer to some other cantons.
Table 1 includes three more variables (columns 10–12). Their theoreti-
cal interest is relatively limited, and they are included just as an illustration 
of the fact that independent variables can measure attributes of the dyad 
(“Same language”), of the potential “receiver” (“Populationi”), and of the 
potential “sender” (“Populationj”).
Finally, an important issue is how the dependent variable can be con-
structed with more complex data structures. In Table 1, the policy of each 
state is measured by a single variable, and coding the dependent variable 
is straightforward, but in some cases, policies can have several dimen-
sions. Volden (2006), for example, identifies six different components of 
Children’s Health Insurance Programs in U.S. states, namely, whether the 
program is part of Medicaid or not, eligibility thresholds, benefits levels, 
waiting period before enrollment, and presence of copayments. Volden 
(2006) codes the dependent variable 1 if Statei adopts at time t a policy that 
Statej already had at time t–1. Unlike in the fictitious example that we have 
just discussed, however, this coding leads to loss of information, since it is 
possible that Statei moves closer to Statej on one policy dimension, but at 
the same time moves further from it on other dimensions. To address this 
issue, as a robustness check Volden (2006) conducts a factor analysis to 
reduce the dimensionality of the policy space and then codes the dependent 
variable 1 if the Euclidean distance between the two states in the dyad de-
creases. Multidimensional scaling techniques can also be used to compute 
distances in a multidimensional policy space.
Although throughout the discussion we have assumed that policies are 
measured through categorical variables (which is the case in many diffu-
sion analyses and most dyadic studies), a continuous measure can also be 
employed. In this case, one could code the dependent variable 1 if Statei 
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moves closer to Statej (that is, if |policyAt - policyBt–1| < |policyAt–1 - poli-
cy
Bt–1|), or simply calculate the (absolute) difference in the two policies, in 
which case the dependent variable remains continuous.
Methodological Issues
As we have seen, dyadic datasets are commonly employed in the interna-
tional relations literature, in which dependent variables are often relational. 
In diffusion studies, the dependent variable is not relational because mu-
tual influences are unobservable. Nevertheless, as long as the dependent 
variable can be defined as some form of “increased similarity” between 
two states, the dyadic set up can be useful because it permits one to easily 
include relational independent variables in the analysis, along with vari-
ables measuring the characteristics of the two states in the dyad. However, 
the analysis of dyadic datasets entails a number of complications, to which 
we now turn.
(1) Standard Event-history Analysis Issues.–––The first set of methodo-
logical issues is not specific to the dyadic approach and concerns all types 
of event-history analyses. We focus here on the logit approach, which, as 
Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) have shown, is equivalent to the Cox model 
as long as appropriate corrections are introduced3.
The first point is time dependence: while standard event-history tech-
niques model the baseline hazard directly (either parametrically – like in 
the Weibull model – or nonparametrically – like in the Cox model), in 
the logit approach, one needs an explicit control. Beck, Katz, and Tucker 
(1998) advocate the use of cubic splines, but recently Carter and Signorino 
(2007) have suggested that the simple inclusion of t, t2, and t3 performs as 
well as splines. Time dummies are, in principle, another option, but they 
are problematic for rare-events data because they predict failure perfectly 
for years when no change happened (that is, when the dependent variable 
was 0 for all units). In the logit framework, this means that many observa-
tions must be dropped (Carter and Signorino 2007).
Second, in case of “multiple failures” – in our context, if more than one 
“imitation” is possible – we need to relax the default assumption that all 
imitations events are generated identically, or in other words that subse-
quent imitations are independent from the previous imitation history. This 
3 For a thorough treatment of event-history techniques, see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 
(2004).
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issue is not easily solved even in standard state-year framework. Beck, 
Katz, and Tucker (1998, 1272) suggest the “primitive” solution of simply 
including a variable that counts the number of previous events. This ap-
proach is justified in some instances, namely if its implicit assumption – 
that “the odds of an event increase by a factor of proportionality with each 
subsequent event occurrence” (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002, 1086) 
– is reasonable. If not, more complex strategies have to be followed in the 
context of the Cox model4 (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002; Box-Stef-
fensmeier and Jones 2004, 155–182). Researchers first have to determine 
the nature of their events, namely, whether they are best conceptualized 
as multiple or repeated events. Multiple events are different events – for 
example, the introduction of various policies or various dimensions of the 
same policy – and can be modeled through a multinomial logit. In this 
case, coefficients are specific for each event. On the other hand, repeated 
events are events of the same type that can occur more than once – for 
instance, tax cuts or increases. Repeated events can be analyzed through a 
conditional Cox model, whose advantage is that the sequence of the events 
is modeled explicitly (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 158-162; Box-
Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002). Concretely, the model allows baseline haz-
ards to vary across events. On the other hand, a single set of coefficients 
is estimated. We should also note that another option has very recently 
been put forward to model repeated events, namely the conditional frailty 
model (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, and Joyce 2007). Unlike the condi-
tional Cox, this model takes into account not only event dependence but 
also cross-sectional heterogeneity.
A third complication is that one of the assumptions of event-history 
models is “that the magnitudes of the effects of covariates on the dura-
tion of a state remain proportional across the life of the process” (Box-
Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003). This is known as the “proportional 
hazards” assumption, which is likely to be violated in many cases because 
it implies that variables have constant effects over time, or in other words, 
that there is no longitudinal heterogeneity. This is a technical problem but, 
above all, it is a substantive issue. In effect, there may often be theoretical 
reasons to think that the nature of the diffusion process changes over time. 
Gilardi, Füglister, and Luyet (2009), for instance, and that learning gained 
importance over time in the diffusion of hospital-financing reforms. Mod-
4 We can note that the vast majority of studies in the international relations literature has 
relied on the inclusion of a count variable.
424 Fabrizio Gilardi and Katharina Füglister
eling nonproportional hazards is quite straightforward: it requires simply 
the introduction of an interaction between some measure of time5 and the 
relevant variable(s) (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003; Box-Stef-
fensmeier and Jones 2004). Diagnostics are available to detect the nonpro-
portionality of hazards, but of course, interactions can also be included a 
priori on theoretical grounds.
Finally, King and Zeng (2001b, 2001a) have recently shown that the 
logit is biased when the event under study is rare, that is, when the depend-
ent variable has many more 0s than 1s, which is likely to be the case in 
many dyadic diffusion studies (and is almost always the case international 
conflict research, which is the context of King and Zeng’s contribution). 
King and Zeng (2001b, 2001a) demonstrate that with rare-events data, the 
logit underestimates Pr(Yit = 1), and they put forward a method, imple-
mented in a package (available for Stata) called relogit (rare-events logit), 
which corrects for the bias in the estimates of the βs.
(2) Dependence Structure and Cross-sectional Heterogeneity.–––Dy-
adic datasets exhibit complex dependence structures, and even more so 
if they are directed. In the hypothetical dataset shown in Table 1, obser-
vations are certainly not independent within dyads: what happens in Ge-
neva-Zurich 2001 depends in part on what happened in the same dyad in 
2000. Second, we can see that a change of policy in Statei is a necessary 
condition for imitation to occur: if Statei keeps its policy constant, it cannot 
become more similar to Statej. Therefore, it means that observations are 
not independent, not only within the same dyad, but also across all dyads 
sharing the same Statei . Third, one could also question the independence 
of observations across dyads sharing the same Statej: is Geneva–Bern re-
ally independent from Zurich–Bern? In this case, however, there does not 
seem to be such a mechanic link as in the case of same Statei dyads. The 
problem of the nonindependence of observations in the directed-dyads ap-
proach has been noted in the literature, but as Bennett and Stam (2000, 
660) conclude, “there is no obvious fix for the problem”. A quick fix, how-
ever, is to assume is that observations are independent across dyads with 
different Statei and to adjust standard errors accordingly
6.
Second, time-series cross-section analyses often include “fixed effects” 
(country dummies) to account for unobserved heterogeneity across units 
(Beck 2001). Recently, this issue was discussed also in the context of dyad-
5 Options include t, ln(t), t , and ln( t ), among other functional forms.
6 In Stata, this can be done by clustering observations on IDi.
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ic analyses of interstate conflicts, and Green, Kim, and Yoon (2001) argued 
that fixed effects for dyads should always be included, at least as a robust-
ness check. Others, however, strongly warned against this practice (Bennett 
and Stam 2000; Beck and Katz 2001; King 2001). Including fixed effects 
in this context raises two types of problems. First, as is well known, fixed 
effects make the estimation of time-invariant (or rarely changing) variables 
difficult because of high collinearity7. Second, and more important, dyads 
where there is no variation on the dependent variable must be dropped 
because of the “separation” problem in the logit model, which arises when 
a variable perfectly predicts the outcome and makes the model impossible 
to estimate (Carter and Signorino 2007). The issue is serious for both dif-
fusion and international conflict analyses, because in both cases, the event 
of interest is rare. In the diffusion analysis conducted by Volden (2006), for 
example, only 10.4% of observations were coded 1 on the dependent vari-
able, while in conflict studies, the proportion can be as low as 0.3% (King 
and Zeng 2001a, 694). This means that a very large share of the data must 
be dropped if fixed effects are included, which is obviously problematic. 
Note that the same problem arises when using time dummies to account 
for time dependence, as noted earlier (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Carter 
and Signorino 2007).
A solution for both problems could come from multilevel modeling 
(Gelman and Hill 2007). A dyadic diffusion model could be conceptualized 
as a nonnested structure in which observations are grouped within Statei , 
Statej, and years. Such a model could be written as follows (see also Shor, 
Bafumi, Keele, and Park 2007):
 yijt ~ Bern(αi + αj + αt + X β) (3)
 αi ~ N(0, σ
2
αi
) (4)
 αj ~ N(0, σ
2
αj
) (5)
 αt ~ N(0, σ
2
αT
) (6)
In this context, the dependent variable is a probability, and so the stochas-
tic component is assumed to follow a Bernoulli distribution (for other de-
pendent variables, other distributions can of course be used). Χβ represents 
explanatory variables at the Statei , Statej, and dyadic levels, along with an 
intercept, and is not indexed for convenience. In addition, the systematic 
component includes three intercepts at the Statei, Statej, and year levels, 
7 Plümper and Troeger (2007) have recently put forward a new technique to solve this 
problem.
426 Fabrizio Gilardi and Katharina Füglister
which are modeled as being drawn from a normal distribution. Perhaps 
more intuitively, the model can also be written as:
 yijt = (αi + αj + αt) + X β + (ϵi + ϵj + ϵt + ϵijt) (7)
There are two important points here. First, each Statei, Statej, and year has 
its own intercept, which helps account for cross-sectional heterogeneity 
while at the same time allowing the inclusion of constant or rarely chang-
ing variables (Gelman and Hill 2007, 269). Second, each level has its own 
error and its own estimated variance, which helps address the complex 
dependencies that arise in dyadic datasets.
This setup seems very promising but would require an in-depth exami-
nation that is beyond the scope of this article. We put it forward here as a 
conjecture and, consequently, we do not pursue it in the empirical illustra-
tion in Section 3. For an early application, see Gilardi (2008).
(3) “Imitation Bias”.–––Boehmke (2008) has recently shown that there 
is a danger of “imitation bias” in dyadic analyses of policy diffusion, which 
arises especially when the policy under examination is measured by a bi-
nary indicator and when there is a clear trend toward the adoption of that 
policy. This configuration is typical of many country-year event-history 
analyses of international policy diffusion, for example, pension privatiza-
tion (Brooks 2005) or independent regulatory agencies (Jordana and Levi-
Faur 2005; Gilardi 2005), and corresponds to the classic S-shaped process 
in which at the beginning, all countries have a given policy and progres-
sively switch to an alternative. If we analyze such data in a dyadic frame-
work, the problem is that Pr(yijt = 1) = 0 unless Statej has already adopted 
the new policy. In other words, a necessary condition for the dependent 
variable to be coded 1 is that Statej does not have the same policy as Statei. 
It also follows that Pr(yijt = 1) increases as Pr(yijt = 1) increases, that is, as 
the probability that Statej adopts the new policy (and thus can be emulated) 
increases. In a dyadic setup, any variable marking a Statej that has adopted 
the new policy will turn out to be positive and significant simply because 
it identifies a state that can be emulated, in contrast to states that cannot be 
emulated because, like Statei, they still have the old policy.
The severity of this problem depends on the nature of the policy. In 
Volden’s (2006) study, there is not a clear trend away from one policy and 
towards another one, but instead, there is a complex mix of policies that 
states change over time, which makes them more similar to some states 
and more different from others. In this context, the problem highlighted 
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by Boehmke (2008) is much less worrisome, although dyad-years where 
Pr(yijt = 1) = 0 (that is, where emulation is impossible) may still exist, and 
those are where Statei and Statej have identical mixes of policies. The like-
lihood of this combination decreases with the number of policy dimensions 
and with the level of measurement of each of the dimensions, the best case 
being where it is interval-ratio, and the worst in which it is nominal or or-
dinal with just two categories.
As a solution, Boehmke (2008) suggests to condition the estimation on 
the “opportunity to imitate” – in other words, to exclude from the analysis 
dyad-years in which Pr(yijt = 1) = 0. These dyad-years are those where yit = 
yjt–1, which makes it impossible for Statei to become more similar to Statej 
since they both already have the same policy. Monte Carlo simulations 
show that with this adjustment, dyadic analyses are much less likely to find 
diffusion effects where none exist.
Boehmke (2008) studies this problem only within a rather narrow set 
of assumptions on the data-generating process, and his conclusions should 
therefore not (yet) be seen as definitive. However, his warning is on-the-
spot, and his simple correction can certainly be used at least as a robustness 
check.
Empirical Illustration: Health-insurance Subsidy Policies in Swiss 
Cantons
The previous section has shown that a dyadic setup can be used to study 
policy diffusion in federal states. On the other hand, researchers need to 
be aware of a series of complications that need to be addressed in empiri-
cal analyses. Some of these issues are quite well understood, while others, 
such as complex dependencies in the data and potential “imitation biases”, 
have just begun to be explored.
In this section we present an empirical application. Our goal is to il-
lustrate how the dyadic approach can be applied in the Swiss context. 
Although we focus on a specific policy, the main characteristics – loose 
federal framework and varied cantonal implementations – are typical of 
Switzerland and can be found in many, if not most, other areas. This illus-
tration, therefore, aims to demonstrate that the dyadic approach is a fruitful 
way to investigate a highly relevant, yet so far largely neglected aspect of 
Swiss policy making.
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Health insurance subsidies in the LAMal
With the Health Insurance Law of 1994 (LAMal), which came into force 
in 1996, Switzerland introduced mandatory health insurance with uniform 
premiums for each person irrespective of his or her financial situation. In 
order to reduce the social inequalities created by per capita premiums and to 
ensure solidarity between people with different income levels, the LAMal 
introduced mechanisms for the reduction of the individual premiums. In 
2004, about one third of the Swiss population were beneficiaries of health 
insurance subsidies. Since cantons are in charge of the implementation of 
the law, however, outcomes differ greatly across regions.
As a consequence of the significant freedom given to cantons, 26 dif-
ferent subsidy policies have been developed since the LAMal came into 
force. Cantons have changed parts of their policies several times. We can 
distinguish five major domains in which the implementation of the federal 
law varies, namely eligibility and benefits, identification of beneficiaries, 
up-to-dateness of calculations, modalities of payment, and exhaustion of 
the federal contribution8 (Balthasar 2003). Within these five domains, can-
tons have changed their practices several times during the last ten years. 
There have been some tendencies towards convergence, for example to-
ward the use of a percentage model to define eligibility, or toward the pay-
ment of subsidies directly to the insurers to guarantee the earmarked use 
of the money. But despite these changes and several attempts to harmonize 
the system, differences between cantons remain: they still use their free-
dom in the implementation of the federal law and experiment with differ-
ent practices.
Hypotheses
In this section, we present the hypotheses that guide the statistical analysis. 
Their purpose in the context of this article is to illustrate how a dyadic 
analysis can accommodate variables on Cantonis, Cantonjs, and on the re-
lationship between the two.
A first set of simple and quite atheoretical hypotheses relate to char-
acteristics of Cantoni. We conjecture that the population of a canton, its 
language, the level of its insurance premiums, how many people receive 
subsidies, and the partisan affiliation of the health minister can be related 
8 A short description of these dimensions is provided in Appendix 2.
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to the probability that a canton adopts a policy that is already in place 
elsewhere.
A strongly theoretical hypothesis is related to a characteristic of Can-
tonj, namely, the extent to which their subsidy policies are “successful”. 
Defining and measuring the “success” of a policy is of course tricky; we 
will explain our strategy in detail in the next section. This hypothesis is 
based on Volden’s (2006) finding that more successful policies are more 
likely to be adopted elsewhere, and is linked to the broader literature on the 
role of learning in diffusion processes (Meseguer 2004; Meseguer 2006a; 
Meseguer 2006b; Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006; Gilardi, Füglister, 
and Luyet 2008).
Third, we have a number of relational hypotheses. We expect cantons 
to be more likely to take up the policies of other cantons in the same region 
or that share the same language, which can be either a bounded form of 
learning in which “available” examples are taken into account, or a form of 
emulation were conformity within peer groups is pursued. We also expect 
cantons to look more closely at other cantons with similar levels of insur-
ance premiums, because this signals shared problems and therefore also 
potentially useful solutions. This would also be a bounded form of learn-
ing. Finally, if partisan networks play a role in the diffusion of policies, 
a canton might be more likely to imitate another canton if the two health 
ministers are from the same party.
Operationalizations and Data
Our dependent variable has six components that refer to four different as-
pects of cantonal policies. On this basis, the dependent variable records 
whether Cantoni adopts at least one of the policies of Cantonj. We have col-
lected data on changes in the subsidy policies of the 26 Swiss cantons from 
1997 (that is, one year after the implementation of the LAMal) to 2005. 
We have relied on three sources: the Conference of the Cantonal Direc-
tors of Public Health, which publishes yearly synoptic tables on the policy 
instruments concerning the health insurance premium reduction practices 
of each canton (GDK 2006); monitoring reports published by the Federal 
Office of Public Health, which examine the effectiveness of the health care 
subsidies (Balthasar, Bieri, and Müller 2005); and Balthasar’s (2003) study 
of cantonal subsidy policies.
To test the learning hypothesis, we have constructed a variable for 
measuring the success of cantonal policies. Measuring success is inher-
430 Fabrizio Gilardi and Katharina Füglister
ently difficult, and what we propose here is just a first cut. We assume 
that the relevant outcome is the generosity of the subsidy. We measure 
this simply by dividing the annual budget for insurance subsidies in each 
canton by the number of beneficiaries. In other words, this is the yearly 
amount that, on average, a subsidy beneficiary receives in each canton. 
The assumption is that the higher the amount, the better. While it is prob-
ably not accurate to assume that all cantons aim for higher generosity, it is 
worth reminding that most cantons fail to respect the informal standard set 
by the Federal Council according to which for no households should health 
insurance exceed 8% of revenue. In this sense, more generous cantons are 
closer to this benchmark, and therefore can to some extent be considered 
more “successful”.
In addition, to assess the degree of “success”, we take into account a 
number of factors that are more or less “mechanically” related to cantonal 
generosity levels, that is, that do not depend on the effectiveness of the 
specific policy mix. The first is the extent to which federal contributions 
are used. The federal level attributes to each canton a given sum for subsi-
dies. In principle, cantons should throw in an equal amount, but they can 
reduce it by up to 50%. The more they make use of this possibility, the 
lower their budget, all else equal. Second, cantonal variations in generos-
ity are explained by differences in health insurance premiums: the higher 
the premiums, the higher the subsidies, all else equal. Third, cantons can 
choose whether to give more money to fewer people or less money to more 
people. Therefore, the share of the population that receives a subsidy is 
also a relevant factor that must be taken into account.
The basic idea in our operationalization is that a “good” cantonal policy 
is one that is more generous than the Swiss average, taking these factors 
into account. Following Volden (2006), for each year we have regressed 
generosity on the use of federal contributions, insurance premiums lev-
els, and share of beneficiaries. These three factors are strong predictors of 
generosity levels: the R2 is above 0.9. We have then compared predicted 
and actual generosity levels. The results for year 2000 are shown in Figure 
1. In the canton of Geneva (GE), for instance, each beneficiary received 
less money than he or she should have, taking into account the level of 
premiums in this canton, the number of beneficiaries, and what share of 
the federal contribution was used. By contrast, the canton of Vaud (VD) is 
more successful: the generosity of its subsidy policy is much higher than 
it should be, given its level of premiums, the number of beneficiaries, and 
the use of federal contributions. We therefore use the difference between 
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actual and predicted values as an indicator of success. While Volden (2006) 
coded successes in a binary way, we keep the continuous measure that re-
sults from this computation. Success can be a matter of degree.
Information on the partisan affiliation of cantonal health ministers 
comes from the Jahrbuch Schweizer Politik, 1995–2005. Shared partisan-
ship for health ministers is coded 1 if PartyA,t = PartyA,t–1 and PartyA,t–1 = 
Party
B,t–1, that is, if the health minister of Cantoni is from the same party as 
the minister of Cantonj in the previous year, and was already in place the 
previous year.
We have also constructed variables for various similarities between 
cantons. First, two variables record whether the two cantons in the dyad 
belong to the same region or have the same main language. Second, we 
look at health insurance premiums, beneficiary rates, and population size. 
For insurance premiums, we have also computed the absolute difference 
between Cantoni and Cantonj. For the evolution of the health insurance 
premiums and the rate of the beneficiaries, we relied on the statistics pub-
lished by the Federal Office of Public Health, while data on the size of the 
population come from the Federal Statistical Office.
Figure 1: Measuring the “success” of health insurance policies (year 2000)
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Results
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 2. The first model is a logit 
in which all observations are included, while the second, following (Boe-
hmke 2008), excludes dyad-years where yit = yjt–1 to correct for potential 
“imitation bias”. Models 3 and 4 repeat this sequence but with a differ-
ent estimator, namely King and Zeng’s (2001b, 2001a) rare-events logit. 
This may be appropriate because our dependent variable is coded 1 in only 
5.4% of observations in the full dataset (6.2% after conditioning on the 
“opportunity to imitate”).
A first look at the results shows that they are quite consistent across 
specifications and that imitation is influenced by characteristics of both 
Cantoni and Cantonj, as well as of their relationship. Cantoni is significant-
ly more likely to adopt a policy that Cantonj already has if its population 
is larger and if its health minister is a member of the liberal FDP party. On 
the other hand, Cantonj’s policies are more likely to be imitated if they are 
“successful” – in our definition, if the canton manages to be more gener-
ous than average, controlling for its specificities. This finding can be seen 
as supportive of the learning hypothesis. Furthermore, cantons are more 
likely to imitate cantons in the same region as well as those that have simi-
lar levels of health insurance premiums. Finally, an interesting result is that 
partisan networks seem to matter: cantons in which the health minister is 
affiliated with the Christian-Democratic party (CVP) are more likely to 
adopt the policy of another canton if the latter also had a Christian-Demo-
cratic health minister in the previous year.
To better understand what these results mean, it is useful to look at how 
the probability of imitation varies as a function of these variables. Figures 
2–5 show predicted probabilities and the associated confidence intervals, 
computed with Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). An important 
point for the interpretation of the graphs is that the relationships they depict 
depend on on the values at which variables not shown in the figure (that is, 
all variables in Table 2 except that represented on the x-axis of the figure) 
are kept constant, and this for two reasons. First, like in linear models, each 
independent variable contributes to the level of the dependent variable. 
Second, and more subtly, nonlinear model such as the logit include implicit 
interaction effects (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Kam and Franzese 
2007, 112–13; Berry, Esarey, and Rubin 2007). A discussion of this point 
is beyond the scope of this article, but the intuition is that, in a logit, a 
variable has greater effects if the predicted probabilities are closer to 0.5 
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Table 2: Logit analysis of the probability that Cantoni imitates Cantonj
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses (for clustering on Cantoni). * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constant, time, time2, and time3 included 
but not shown to save space.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Populationi 0.002** 0.001** 0.002** 0.001*
(2.27) (1.96) (2.24) (1.94)
Premiumsi -0.009 -0.011 -0.009 -0.011
(0.97) (1.09) (0.94) (1.06)
Beneciariesi -0.031 -0.038 -0.030 -0.037
(1.10) (1.29) (1.09) (1.29)
Languagei (German) 0.628 0.513 0.623 0.509
(0.62) (0.50) (0.61) (0.50)
FDPi 1.583*** 1.421** 1.559*** 1.398**
(2.85) (2.43) (2.82) (2.40)
SVPi 1.286 1.181 1.266 1.160
(1.46) (1.32) (1.45) (1.30)
CVPi 1.410* 1.336 1.393* 1.319
(1.79) (1.61) (1.77) (1.60)
SPi 0.821 0.613 0.804 0.598
(1.51) (0.97) (1.49) (0.95)
Successj 44.483** 87.130*** 46.869** 87.825***
(2.05) (5.20) (2.17) (5.27)
Same region 0.169*** 0.222*** 0.172*** 0.224***
(2.63) (3.05) (2.69) (3.10)
Same language -0.135 -0.169 -0.138 -0.171
(0.48) (0.62) (0.50) (0.63)
Same party(CVP) 0.586*** 0.498*** 0.601*** 0.513***
(4.09) (2.77) (4.22) (2.87)
Same party (SVP) -0.338 -0.385 -0.198 -0.245
(0.70) (0.83) (0.41) (0.53)
Same party (FDP) -0.020 0.018 0.010 0.046
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.15)
Same party (SP) -0.512 -0.684* -0.488 -0.658*
(1.49) (1.78) (1.43) (1.72)
PremiumsA – premiumsB -0.010** -0.011*** -0.010** -0.010***
(2.50) (2.68) (2.48) (2.65)
Wald χ2 199.81 722.82 – –
Observations 5’200 4’536 5’200 4’536
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(where the slope of the S-shaped curve is steeper). So if x1 has a strong 
influence on the outcome and moves the probability close to 1, it forces x2, 
x3, etc. to have smaller effects, since the probability cannot exceed 1. This 
is sometimes known as the “compression effect”.
With these two caveats in mind, we can proceed to the interpretation of 
the figures.
Figure 2 shows that the partisan affiliation of the health minister influ-
ences the probability of imitation: cantons in which the health minister is a 
radical (FDP) are more likely to take up policies already present elsewhere. 
More precisely, it seems that an FDP minister is a sort of necessary condi-
tion for imitation. If the minister is not FDP, imitation is unlikely: the point 
estimate is close to 0 with a narrow confidence interval. By contrast, if the 
minister is FDP, the predicted probability of imitation is higher, but with 
a much larger confidence interval, meaning that some cantons with FDP 
ministers tend to imitate, but others do not.
Figure 3 shows how the probability of imitation increases as Cantonj’s 
policy becomes more “successful”. This evidence is consistent with learn-
ing arguments, which state that policy makers update their beliefs on the 
effects of policies by looking at the experience of others. Figure 3 indicates 
that Cantoni is more likely to adopt a policy that Cantonj already has if the 
latter has proved to be effective. Of course, the specific indicator of “suc-
cess” can be debated, but these results are consistent with the theoretical 
expectations.
The next figures show the effects of the relational characteristics of the 
dyad on the probability of imitation. Figure 4 suggests that partisan net-
works may matter, especially for the Christian-Democratic party (CVP). 
The probability that Cantoni imitates Cantonj is greater if in both cantons 
the health minister is Christian-Democratic, although we see that there is a 
significant overlap in the confidence intervals. Figure 5 is similar: cantons 
tend to imitate other cantons in the same region, but the effect is not very 
significant, neither statistically nor substantively. Finally, Figure 6 shows 
that similarities of health insurance premiums also matter: cantons tend to 
adopt the policies of other cantons in which insurance premiums are ap-
proximately at the same level. This could be evidence for a bounded form 
of learning, in which policy makers are influenced by others sharing simi-
lar problems when looking for solutions.
These findings teach us something new and important about policy 
making in Switzerland. Policies do diffuse across cantons, and the pattern 
is not simply one of geographical proximity, nor of Röstigraben. Learning 
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Figure 2: Predicted probability of imitation as a function of the partisan affiliation of the 
health minister in CantonA
Figure 3: Predicted probability of imitation as a function of the “success” of Canton
B
‘s 
policy
0
.0
5
.1
0
.1
5
.2
0
.2
5
No Yes
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 th
at
 A
 im
ita
te
s B
FDP in canton A
Predicted probability
90% CI
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
.1
.1
2
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 th
at
 c
an
to
n 
A
 a
do
pt
s
a 
po
lic
y 
th
at
 c
an
to
n 
B
 a
lre
ad
y 
ha
s
-.002 0 .002 .004 .006
Success of canton B
Predicted probability
90% CI
436 Fabrizio Gilardi and Katharina Füglister
Figure 4: Predicted probability of imitation as a function of shared partisan affiliation of 
health ministers
Figure 5: Predicted probability of imitation as a function of geographic proximity
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seems to matter, which corroborates the idea that federalism is a “policy 
laboratory” in which best practices can be developed and spread. In addi-
tion, partisan networks seem to play a role, and all cantons are not equally 
prone to imitation. This is a quite rich and nuanced account of diffusion. 
While the analysis is still preliminary and reports work in progress, one 
thing is clear: the dyadic approach is a useful tool to study policy diffusion 
in federal states.
Conclusion
In this article, we have discussed the use of a dyadic approach to study pol-
icy diffusion with a focus on federal states and especially Switzerland. We 
emphasize again that our aim was not to develop a new method, but simply 
to give a practical overview that can be useful for scholars interested in the 
empirical analysis of diffusion. The topic seems to have attracted recent in-
terest in the Swiss political science community (Schaltegger 2004; Kübler 
and Widmer 2007), and we believe that our survey can be a useful tool.
Figure 6: Predicted probability of imitation as a function of the similarity of health insu-
rance premiums
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What defines the dyadic approach is that units of analysis are not states, 
but pairs of states (dyads). This setup has been used extensively in the in-
ternational relations literature, in which the dependent variable is in many 
cases relational (e.g., conflict, trade, foreign investment, etc.). Although, 
in a policy diffusion context, the dependent variable is not observably re-
lational, Volden (2006) has convincingly argued that the dyadic approach 
can nonetheless be useful: defining each state as a potential “sender” and 
“receiver” of a policy allows one to easily include relational variables, 
which are at the core of many diffusion hypotheses.
However, the use of a dyadic approach in policy diffusion studies comes 
with several problems. Since the influence of a state over another state’s 
policy choices is not directly measurable, the dependent variable needs to 
be constructed indirectly, and special attention has to be paid to its inter-
pretation. Policy change, the observable phenomenon, takes place at the 
state level, whereas units of analysis are dyads. The dependent variable, 
therefore, does not record policy change, nor influence (which is unobserv-
able, and whose estimation is the goal of the analysis). It simply measures 
increased similarity in the observed policies of the two states in a dyad. In 
our empirical example, the dependent variable records whether Cantoni 
moves closer to Cantonj in at least one aspect of its health insurance sub-
sidy policy. While similarities can best be measured when looking at pairs, 
diffusion is not a bilateral phenomenon. The goal, therefore, is to uncover 
systematic patterns in increased similarities, which then allow one to make 
inferences about the underlying diffusion process.
Besides the definition of the dependent variable, the analysis of a dy-
adic data set presents further complications. In addition to standard event-
history analysis issues such as time dependence, dyadic diffusion studies 
exhibit complex dependence structures and are potentially biased toward 
detecting imitation. Unfortunately, only partial solutions to these problems 
are currently available. Multilevel methods could be a promising way to 
deal with the particular structure of these datasets.
Our empirical illustration has shown how these methodological issues 
can be addressed in practice and how the dyadic approach contributes to 
a more precise analysis of diffusion patterns in federal states. The em-
pirical analysis of health insurance policies in Swiss cantons has shown 
that cantons are influenced by the policy choices of their peers, and that 
diffusion matters in Swiss federalism. Four results highlight the useful-
ness of the dyadic approach. First, imitation is influenced by the individual 
characteristics of the cantons, as well as by the relationship between the 
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two cantons in a dyad. Second, “similarity” means more than geographic 
proximity. Policy makers are not only more likely to imitate cantons in the 
same region, but they also seem to imitate cantons that are confronted with 
similar problems. Third, learning matters: cantons with successful policies 
are more likely to be imitated. And finally, partisan networks seem to mat-
ter as well.
Although these results are preliminary, they supply new and interesting 
insight into the nature of policy diffusion in Switzerland, and they show 
how the dyadic approach can be fruitfully employed to study how policies 
spread among federal states. The approach has, however, a much broader 
scope and could certainly be employed to study diffusion at other levels, 
such as cities, countries, and in fact any other setting in which diffusion 
hypotheses can be developed.
Appendix : Stata Code for the Construction of a Dyadic Dataset
In most cases, the starting point of a dyadic analysis is a standard data-
set in which observations are state-years. Table 3 shows an excerpt of one 
such dataset.
The first step for the construction of a directed dyadic dataset is to cre-
ate a copy of the original state-year dataset:
copy dataset1.dta dataset2.dta
The joinby command then permits one to create a new dataset includ-
ing all pairwise combinations of observations, which is what we need in 
a dyadic dataset. Before using joinby, however, we have to rename the 
variables so that we know which ones refer to which canton in the dyad. 
To do this, we can employ the renvars routine written by Jeoren Wee-
sie and Nick Cox, which can be located and then downloaded by typing 
findit renvars in Stata. joinby requires one to specify the groups 
within which observations are combined. In our case, the relevant groups 
are identified by the variable year. Therefore, we use the first dataset and 
append all variables except year (which will be used to join the two data-
sets) with the postfix _i:
9 The code can be downloaded at www.fabriziogilardi.org.
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use dataset1.dta 
renvars state-population, postfix(_i) 
rename year_i year 
save, replace
We then do the same for the second dataset, but with the postfix _j:
use dataset2.dta 
renvars state-population, postfix(_j) 
rename year_j year 
save, replace
We can now create the dyadic dataset and rearrange the variables in a more 
convenient order:
use dataset1.dta 
joinby year using dataset2.dta 
save dataset_dyadic.dta
use dataset_dyadic.dta 
order canton_i canton_j year 
sort canton_i canton_j year 
save, replace
Canton Year ID Policy Language Population
Geneva 2000 1 2 1 409’900
Geneva 2001 1 2 1 416’400
Geneva 2002 1 2 1 422’200
Zurich 2000 2 1 2 1’222’200
Zurich 2001 2 1 2 1’242’000
Zurich 2002 2 2 2 1’257’900
Bern 2000 3 3 2 950’600
Bern 2001 3 2 2 952’900
Bern 2002 3 2 2 955’400
Schwyz 2000 4 1 2 128’400
Schwyz 2001 4 1 2 129’600
Schwyz 2002 4 1 2 131’700
Table 3: State-year dataset (excerpt) (dataset1.dta)
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The dataset that results is shown in Table 1. We can now construct the 
dependent variable imitation, following the logic explained in section “Da-
taset Structure and Dependent Variable”. This code loops over all pairwise 
combinations of cantons and all years, and does the following.10 First, it 
captures the policies of Cantoni and Cantonj at time t–1. Second, it codes 
imitation 1 if Cantoni has changed it policy at time t and if the new 
policy is the one that Cantonj had at time  t–1.
g imitation=0 
#delimit ; 
forval i=1/26 {;
forval j=1/26 {;
forval y=1998/2005 {;
quietly sum policy_i if year==‘y’-1 & id_i==‘i’; 
local x=r(mean); 
quietly sum policy_j if year==‘y’-1 & id_j==‘j’; 
local z=r(mean); 
quietly replace imitation=1 if year==‘y’ & 
policy_i!=‘x’ & policy_i==‘z’ & id_i ==‘i’ & 
id_j==‘j’;
};
};
}; 
#delimit cr 
save, replace
We can also create easily independent variables that measure to the rela-
tionship between the two states in the dyad – for example, whether they 
share the same language:
gen samelanguage=0 
replace samelanguage=1 if language_i==language_j 
save, replace
We also need to identify the same-canton dyads that were created through 
the joinby command, because we want to exclude them from the analysis:
10 The #delimit ; line means simply that the end of a command is marked by the semi-
colon instead of the default carriage return. We do this is just to preserve a correct display 
of a long command line in the printed page. We then switch back to the default delimiter 
with #delimit cr.
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gen samecanton=0 
replace samecanton=1 if id_i==id_j 
save, replace
Finally, we also need to create identifiers for dyads. When running the 
analyses, in some cases we may want to adjust the standard errors for the 
nonindependence of observations within dyads. To do this, we can employ 
a simple loop telling Stata to take each pairwise combination of cantons 
and code the variable id_dyad with a unique identifier. The loop starts with 
id_i=1 and id_j=1 and codes id_dyad 1. Then it takes id_i=1 
and id_j=2 and codes the identifier 2 and so on until the dyad where 
id_i=26 and id_j=26 is coded:
gen id_dyad=. 
local x=1 
forval y=1/26 {
forval z=1/26 {
replace dyadid=‘x’ if id_i==‘y’ & id_j==‘z’ 
local x=‘x’+1
}
} 
save, replace
Assuming that all relevant variables are included, the dataset is now ready 
for the analysis.
Appendix 2: The Dimensions of Cantonal Subsidy Policies
(1) Eligibility and Benefits.–––The majority of cantons use a percentage 
model: if premiums exceed a given share of income (which can vary across 
cantons), the person is eligible for benefits. Other cantons use a threshold 
model, in which all households below a certain income are eligible for a 
fixed subsidy. Cantons also use different bases to calculate income.
(2) Identification of Beneficiaries.–––Some cantons identify the ben-
eficiaries on the basis of the tax declaration and then pay the subsidies au-
tomatically, while others automatically inform eligible people, who, how-
ever, still need to fill in an application to receive the subsidy. In a few other 
cantons, potential beneficiaries need to apply for subsidies without having 
been informed about their eligibility status. In some cantons, applications 
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for subsidies can be sent to the cantonal authorities all year through, while 
in others, the form can be handed in only at a specific date.
(3) Up-to-dateness of Calculations.–––Some cantons use final taxation 
decisions, others provisional ones, and still others use salary certificates to 
estimate revenues.
(4) Modalities of Payment.–––In some cantons, subsidies are paid di-
rectly to the insurers, which ensures the earmarked use of the money, while 
others emphasize the transparency of the costs and pay subsidies to the 
beneficiaries, who can thus use them freely and not only to pay their insur-
ance premiums.
(5) Exhaustion of the Federal Contribution.–––Cantons receive a given 
sum from the federal government and should, in principle, add an equal 
amount to the budget for subsidies. However, they can reduce this amount 
up to 50% provided that the social objectives of the policy are not jeopard-
ized. Note that the definition of the objectives is extremely loose so that 
virtually every canton can claim that the reduction is justified. If a canton 
reduces its contribution, then the federal contribution is also cut propor-
tionally.
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Empirisches Modellieren von Politikdiffusion in föderalen Staaten: 
Der dyadische Ansatz
Politikdiffusion ist ein bekanntes Phänomen in föderalen Staaten. Eine der normativen 
Begründungen eines dezentralen Systems besteht darin, dass diese die Entwicklung 
und Verbreitung von optimalen Politiken ermöglicht. Gemäss Berry und Berry (1990) 
ist die Ereignisanalyse die meist gewählte quantitative Methode für die Analyse von 
Politikdiffusion. Kürzlich hat Volden (2006) jedoch eine dyadische Variante dieser Me-
thode eingeführt, wobei anstelle von Staaten, Paare von Staaten die Untersuchungsein-
heiten bilden. Dieser Artikel diskutiert den dyadischen Ansatz mit einem besonderen 
Fokus auf die Diffusion von Politiken in der Schweiz. Dabei soll nicht eine neue Me-
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thode vorgestellt, sondern ein praktischer Überblick für Forschende gegeben werden, 
welche diese Methode anwenden möchten. Der Artikel zeigt auf, wie die Methode von 
der Literatur der Internationalen Beziehungen zur Politikdiffusionsliteratur gelangt ist, 
beschreibt die typische Struktur eines Datensatzes im Kontext der Diffusion und dis-
kutiert verschiedene Aspekte der Modellierung. Der Nutzen des dyadischen Ansatzes 
wird empirisch anhand der Krankenkassenprämienverbilligung in den Schweizer Kan-
tonen illustriert. 
Modelage empirique de la diffusion des politiques dans les Etats fédéraux: 
l’approche dyadique
La diffusion des politiques publiques est un phénomène courant dans les Etats 
fédéraux: l’une des justifications normatives de la décentralisation est précisément que 
celle-ci permet de développer et diffuser des solutions novatrices et performantes aux 
problèmes publics. Suite aux travaux de Berry et Berry (1990), l’analyse de durée 
(event-history analysis) est devenue la méthode principale pour l’étude quantitative 
de la diffusion des politiques publiques. Récemment, Volden (2006) a proposé une 
variante dyadique de cette méthode, dans laquelle les unités d’analyse ne sont pas 
des Etats, mais des paires d’Etats. En se focalisant sur le cas de la Suisse, cet article 
montre d’abord comment l’approche dyadique est passée du domaine des relations 
internationales à celui de la diffusion des politiques publiques, et discute ensuite de 
manière pratique la structure d’une base de données dyadique ainsi que plusieurs en-
jeux inhérents à ce type de modélisation. L’utilité de l’approche dyadique est illustrée 
empiriquement à l'aide des politiques de réduction des primes d'assurance maladie 
dans les cantons suisses.
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